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Lock out of Oracle based on Windows username
schema shows through standard client connection but not through ODBC connection?Oracle out-of-place upgrade on same host: impdp issuesOracle - Need help with RMAN Active Duplication on Windows 32 bit to a 64 bitGlobal locking for multi-master Oracle GoldenGate replicationOracle alternative edition for Windows Server 2012Oracle connection suddenly refused on windows 8Why doesn't “As SYSDBA” work from SQL Developer?ORA-01017 connecting to example schemas on Oracle VM appliance from Windows hostProblems with connecting to a remote Oracle 12c databaseOracle DBLink with username and password
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I have this logon trigger to only allow certain users to log in to an Oracle database (even if they have the correct password to enter the database):
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER SYS.LOGON_TRIGGER
AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE
DECLARE
THIS_USER VARCHAR2(50);
BEGIN
SELECT OSUSER INTO THIS_USER FROM V$SESSION WHERE SID = SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','SID');
IF THIS_USER NOT IN (<List of Users>)
THEN RAISE LOGIN_DENIED;
ENDIF;
END;
/
It works for preventing users from entering most schemas but not all (e.g. the SYS or SYSTEM schemas can still be entered regardless of the user - this logon trigger is seemingly completely bypassed).
Is there a way to lock out these users even for these SYS type schemas?
A bit of context:
Due to decisions made way before I got involved with this, all of the logins for this database have the same password. Additionally, most users use the same login as many of our processes that read/write to this database automatically.
We don't want to simply change the passwords because it would be a very large effort to see what impact changing these passwords actually does to the system. (We would have to modify the code that the processes use to access the database, and there are many of these.) An easier solution for us is to just lock out based on usernames, if possible.
oracle oracle-11g
add a comment |
I have this logon trigger to only allow certain users to log in to an Oracle database (even if they have the correct password to enter the database):
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER SYS.LOGON_TRIGGER
AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE
DECLARE
THIS_USER VARCHAR2(50);
BEGIN
SELECT OSUSER INTO THIS_USER FROM V$SESSION WHERE SID = SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','SID');
IF THIS_USER NOT IN (<List of Users>)
THEN RAISE LOGIN_DENIED;
ENDIF;
END;
/
It works for preventing users from entering most schemas but not all (e.g. the SYS or SYSTEM schemas can still be entered regardless of the user - this logon trigger is seemingly completely bypassed).
Is there a way to lock out these users even for these SYS type schemas?
A bit of context:
Due to decisions made way before I got involved with this, all of the logins for this database have the same password. Additionally, most users use the same login as many of our processes that read/write to this database automatically.
We don't want to simply change the passwords because it would be a very large effort to see what impact changing these passwords actually does to the system. (We would have to modify the code that the processes use to access the database, and there are many of these.) An easier solution for us is to just lock out based on usernames, if possible.
oracle oracle-11g
1
A trigger is not going to change the security nightmare that "all of the logins for this database have the same password" is.
– kevinsky
5 hours ago
@kevinsky In that case, it probably is better to just change the passwords and deal with the impacts. I guess the easiest solution isn't always the best.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
5 hours ago
BTW: the osuser is (if you don’t use Kerberos or Similiar methods) only advisory (the driver can send any name it likes) so it is really not a good security mechanism and having strictly separate passwords is the way to go.
– eckes
2 hours ago
add a comment |
I have this logon trigger to only allow certain users to log in to an Oracle database (even if they have the correct password to enter the database):
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER SYS.LOGON_TRIGGER
AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE
DECLARE
THIS_USER VARCHAR2(50);
BEGIN
SELECT OSUSER INTO THIS_USER FROM V$SESSION WHERE SID = SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','SID');
IF THIS_USER NOT IN (<List of Users>)
THEN RAISE LOGIN_DENIED;
ENDIF;
END;
/
It works for preventing users from entering most schemas but not all (e.g. the SYS or SYSTEM schemas can still be entered regardless of the user - this logon trigger is seemingly completely bypassed).
Is there a way to lock out these users even for these SYS type schemas?
A bit of context:
Due to decisions made way before I got involved with this, all of the logins for this database have the same password. Additionally, most users use the same login as many of our processes that read/write to this database automatically.
We don't want to simply change the passwords because it would be a very large effort to see what impact changing these passwords actually does to the system. (We would have to modify the code that the processes use to access the database, and there are many of these.) An easier solution for us is to just lock out based on usernames, if possible.
oracle oracle-11g
I have this logon trigger to only allow certain users to log in to an Oracle database (even if they have the correct password to enter the database):
CREATE OR REPLACE TRIGGER SYS.LOGON_TRIGGER
AFTER LOGON ON DATABASE
DECLARE
THIS_USER VARCHAR2(50);
BEGIN
SELECT OSUSER INTO THIS_USER FROM V$SESSION WHERE SID = SYS_CONTEXT('USERENV','SID');
IF THIS_USER NOT IN (<List of Users>)
THEN RAISE LOGIN_DENIED;
ENDIF;
END;
/
It works for preventing users from entering most schemas but not all (e.g. the SYS or SYSTEM schemas can still be entered regardless of the user - this logon trigger is seemingly completely bypassed).
Is there a way to lock out these users even for these SYS type schemas?
A bit of context:
Due to decisions made way before I got involved with this, all of the logins for this database have the same password. Additionally, most users use the same login as many of our processes that read/write to this database automatically.
We don't want to simply change the passwords because it would be a very large effort to see what impact changing these passwords actually does to the system. (We would have to modify the code that the processes use to access the database, and there are many of these.) An easier solution for us is to just lock out based on usernames, if possible.
oracle oracle-11g
oracle oracle-11g
asked 5 hours ago
ImaginaryHuman072889ImaginaryHuman072889
1155
1155
1
A trigger is not going to change the security nightmare that "all of the logins for this database have the same password" is.
– kevinsky
5 hours ago
@kevinsky In that case, it probably is better to just change the passwords and deal with the impacts. I guess the easiest solution isn't always the best.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
5 hours ago
BTW: the osuser is (if you don’t use Kerberos or Similiar methods) only advisory (the driver can send any name it likes) so it is really not a good security mechanism and having strictly separate passwords is the way to go.
– eckes
2 hours ago
add a comment |
1
A trigger is not going to change the security nightmare that "all of the logins for this database have the same password" is.
– kevinsky
5 hours ago
@kevinsky In that case, it probably is better to just change the passwords and deal with the impacts. I guess the easiest solution isn't always the best.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
5 hours ago
BTW: the osuser is (if you don’t use Kerberos or Similiar methods) only advisory (the driver can send any name it likes) so it is really not a good security mechanism and having strictly separate passwords is the way to go.
– eckes
2 hours ago
1
1
A trigger is not going to change the security nightmare that "all of the logins for this database have the same password" is.
– kevinsky
5 hours ago
A trigger is not going to change the security nightmare that "all of the logins for this database have the same password" is.
– kevinsky
5 hours ago
@kevinsky In that case, it probably is better to just change the passwords and deal with the impacts. I guess the easiest solution isn't always the best.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
5 hours ago
@kevinsky In that case, it probably is better to just change the passwords and deal with the impacts. I guess the easiest solution isn't always the best.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
5 hours ago
BTW: the osuser is (if you don’t use Kerberos or Similiar methods) only advisory (the driver can send any name it likes) so it is really not a good security mechanism and having strictly separate passwords is the way to go.
– eckes
2 hours ago
BTW: the osuser is (if you don’t use Kerberos or Similiar methods) only advisory (the driver can send any name it likes) so it is really not a good security mechanism and having strictly separate passwords is the way to go.
– eckes
2 hours ago
add a comment |
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
I suggest a multi-phase approach that can be implemented in stages and will minimize the impact of changing to a more secure approach. I assume that you have a development environment to test in and the support of a manager who is interested and will support the effort.
- use the existing Oracle audit logging to start logging when users logon and logoff.
- after a period of time consistent with usage (90 days for a fiscal quarter?, a year end?) identify the unused accounts and lock them
- identify any service accounts that are not used by people to log on.
- identify the remaining accounts and try to link usernames to people to job roles
- create Oracle profiles for service accounts, read only accounts and more privileged user accounts
- set password expiration, complexity, reuse, failed attempts before lockout for these profiles. For example you may decide that service accounts should never change their password but that it should be 24 characters and only one failed attempt before lockout whereas a person's password should only be 8 characters with three failed attempts before lockout.
- one by one reassign accounts to the correct profile and force a password change
- at the same time look at creating roles that grant only enough privileges for accounts to do their job and assign the roles.
This is just the tip of the iceberg for securing the database. The level of effort you put in should be commensurate with the potential damage if the information in the database were breached.
You bring up many good points here. We do have a test environment and yes my manager will support this. Thanks again.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
3 hours ago
add a comment |
The reason why your trigger does not work for users like SYS or SYSTEM is because they have the ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege.
The ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege allows you to create database-level triggers (server error, login, and logout triggers). It also allows you to log in regardless of errors thrown by a login trigger as a failsafe.
So, the answer is: no, you cannot prevent login for such users - at least not with a login trigger.
add a comment |
Your Answer
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2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
2 Answers
2
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
active
oldest
votes
I suggest a multi-phase approach that can be implemented in stages and will minimize the impact of changing to a more secure approach. I assume that you have a development environment to test in and the support of a manager who is interested and will support the effort.
- use the existing Oracle audit logging to start logging when users logon and logoff.
- after a period of time consistent with usage (90 days for a fiscal quarter?, a year end?) identify the unused accounts and lock them
- identify any service accounts that are not used by people to log on.
- identify the remaining accounts and try to link usernames to people to job roles
- create Oracle profiles for service accounts, read only accounts and more privileged user accounts
- set password expiration, complexity, reuse, failed attempts before lockout for these profiles. For example you may decide that service accounts should never change their password but that it should be 24 characters and only one failed attempt before lockout whereas a person's password should only be 8 characters with three failed attempts before lockout.
- one by one reassign accounts to the correct profile and force a password change
- at the same time look at creating roles that grant only enough privileges for accounts to do their job and assign the roles.
This is just the tip of the iceberg for securing the database. The level of effort you put in should be commensurate with the potential damage if the information in the database were breached.
You bring up many good points here. We do have a test environment and yes my manager will support this. Thanks again.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
3 hours ago
add a comment |
I suggest a multi-phase approach that can be implemented in stages and will minimize the impact of changing to a more secure approach. I assume that you have a development environment to test in and the support of a manager who is interested and will support the effort.
- use the existing Oracle audit logging to start logging when users logon and logoff.
- after a period of time consistent with usage (90 days for a fiscal quarter?, a year end?) identify the unused accounts and lock them
- identify any service accounts that are not used by people to log on.
- identify the remaining accounts and try to link usernames to people to job roles
- create Oracle profiles for service accounts, read only accounts and more privileged user accounts
- set password expiration, complexity, reuse, failed attempts before lockout for these profiles. For example you may decide that service accounts should never change their password but that it should be 24 characters and only one failed attempt before lockout whereas a person's password should only be 8 characters with three failed attempts before lockout.
- one by one reassign accounts to the correct profile and force a password change
- at the same time look at creating roles that grant only enough privileges for accounts to do their job and assign the roles.
This is just the tip of the iceberg for securing the database. The level of effort you put in should be commensurate with the potential damage if the information in the database were breached.
You bring up many good points here. We do have a test environment and yes my manager will support this. Thanks again.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
3 hours ago
add a comment |
I suggest a multi-phase approach that can be implemented in stages and will minimize the impact of changing to a more secure approach. I assume that you have a development environment to test in and the support of a manager who is interested and will support the effort.
- use the existing Oracle audit logging to start logging when users logon and logoff.
- after a period of time consistent with usage (90 days for a fiscal quarter?, a year end?) identify the unused accounts and lock them
- identify any service accounts that are not used by people to log on.
- identify the remaining accounts and try to link usernames to people to job roles
- create Oracle profiles for service accounts, read only accounts and more privileged user accounts
- set password expiration, complexity, reuse, failed attempts before lockout for these profiles. For example you may decide that service accounts should never change their password but that it should be 24 characters and only one failed attempt before lockout whereas a person's password should only be 8 characters with three failed attempts before lockout.
- one by one reassign accounts to the correct profile and force a password change
- at the same time look at creating roles that grant only enough privileges for accounts to do their job and assign the roles.
This is just the tip of the iceberg for securing the database. The level of effort you put in should be commensurate with the potential damage if the information in the database were breached.
I suggest a multi-phase approach that can be implemented in stages and will minimize the impact of changing to a more secure approach. I assume that you have a development environment to test in and the support of a manager who is interested and will support the effort.
- use the existing Oracle audit logging to start logging when users logon and logoff.
- after a period of time consistent with usage (90 days for a fiscal quarter?, a year end?) identify the unused accounts and lock them
- identify any service accounts that are not used by people to log on.
- identify the remaining accounts and try to link usernames to people to job roles
- create Oracle profiles for service accounts, read only accounts and more privileged user accounts
- set password expiration, complexity, reuse, failed attempts before lockout for these profiles. For example you may decide that service accounts should never change their password but that it should be 24 characters and only one failed attempt before lockout whereas a person's password should only be 8 characters with three failed attempts before lockout.
- one by one reassign accounts to the correct profile and force a password change
- at the same time look at creating roles that grant only enough privileges for accounts to do their job and assign the roles.
This is just the tip of the iceberg for securing the database. The level of effort you put in should be commensurate with the potential damage if the information in the database were breached.
answered 5 hours ago
kevinskykevinsky
3,1692145
3,1692145
You bring up many good points here. We do have a test environment and yes my manager will support this. Thanks again.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
3 hours ago
add a comment |
You bring up many good points here. We do have a test environment and yes my manager will support this. Thanks again.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
3 hours ago
You bring up many good points here. We do have a test environment and yes my manager will support this. Thanks again.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
3 hours ago
You bring up many good points here. We do have a test environment and yes my manager will support this. Thanks again.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
3 hours ago
add a comment |
The reason why your trigger does not work for users like SYS or SYSTEM is because they have the ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege.
The ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege allows you to create database-level triggers (server error, login, and logout triggers). It also allows you to log in regardless of errors thrown by a login trigger as a failsafe.
So, the answer is: no, you cannot prevent login for such users - at least not with a login trigger.
add a comment |
The reason why your trigger does not work for users like SYS or SYSTEM is because they have the ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege.
The ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege allows you to create database-level triggers (server error, login, and logout triggers). It also allows you to log in regardless of errors thrown by a login trigger as a failsafe.
So, the answer is: no, you cannot prevent login for such users - at least not with a login trigger.
add a comment |
The reason why your trigger does not work for users like SYS or SYSTEM is because they have the ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege.
The ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege allows you to create database-level triggers (server error, login, and logout triggers). It also allows you to log in regardless of errors thrown by a login trigger as a failsafe.
So, the answer is: no, you cannot prevent login for such users - at least not with a login trigger.
The reason why your trigger does not work for users like SYS or SYSTEM is because they have the ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege.
The ADMINISTER DATABASE TRIGGER privilege allows you to create database-level triggers (server error, login, and logout triggers). It also allows you to log in regardless of errors thrown by a login trigger as a failsafe.
So, the answer is: no, you cannot prevent login for such users - at least not with a login trigger.
answered 3 hours ago
Wernfried DomscheitWernfried Domscheit
1,282612
1,282612
add a comment |
add a comment |
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1
A trigger is not going to change the security nightmare that "all of the logins for this database have the same password" is.
– kevinsky
5 hours ago
@kevinsky In that case, it probably is better to just change the passwords and deal with the impacts. I guess the easiest solution isn't always the best.
– ImaginaryHuman072889
5 hours ago
BTW: the osuser is (if you don’t use Kerberos or Similiar methods) only advisory (the driver can send any name it likes) so it is really not a good security mechanism and having strictly separate passwords is the way to go.
– eckes
2 hours ago